Post by @JKeynesAlpha

4. Implications. The role of Mike Alfred in this story is not that of a simple retail investor. He is a critical component of a sophisticated, modern financial marketing campaign. His “credible insider” status, derived from his past exits and board seat at IREN, is used to legitimize the new Strive narrative. IREN’s legitimization is necessary to create market demand and, crucially, liquidity for the insider exit. A massive, newly-public 1.28 billion-share insider stake (detailed in Section 4.3) cannot be sold into the open market without a legion of new, enthusiastic buyers to absorb the shares. Whether willingly or not, Mike Alfred’s promotion functions as the “cover” for the insider exit, creating the very retail liquidity that the “selling securityholders” require to cash out.

• The “Good”: The company has aggressively and successfully executed its stated mission of accumulating Bitcoin. It has rapidly amassed a significant treasury of 7,525 BTC as of November 10, 2025. A pending acquisition of Semler Scientific (SMLR) is set to increase this holding to over 10,900 BTC. The asset side of the ledger is tangible and growing. • The “Bad”: The Bitcoin treasury was funded by issuing a new, high-yield perpetual preferred stock, “SATA” (Nasdaq: SATA). This is a senior liability, not equity, which creates an enormous $24 million annual dividend burden that sits senior to all common stock (ASST) holders. This represents a 12% to 15% effective cost of capital, a high-interest hurdle that creates a significant drag on common equity value. • The “Ugly”: A Form S-3 filed with the SEC registers the potential resale of 1.28 billion shares of “common stock. These shares are being sold by “certain selling securityholders”, who are the private-company insiders (Strive Enterprises) that received a 94.2% insider stake in the Strive Enterprise through a recent reverse merger. The entire “Bitcoin Treasury” narrative, promoted by investor Mike Alfred, appears to be the mechanism to generate the necessary market liquidity and high price for these insiders to exit and cash out their massive, newly-public stake.

• Is it a “scam”? “Scam” is a legal term. This analysis concludes that ASST is not a traditional fraud but exhibits the classic characteristics of a highly sophisticated, legally-papered, promotion-driven wealth transfer vehicle. The entire corporate structure appears engineered to facilitate a massive exit for private, pre-merger insiders at the expense of new, public-market retail investors. • Is the leadership credible? The leadership is a key feature of the promotion. The company has assembled a “super-group” of highly credible individuals, including an institutional-grade CEO from CalPERS (Matt Cole) and a board of directors stacked with prominent Bitcoin-native advocates (Pierre Rochard, James Lavish) and an Ivy League law professor. This credibility is a strategic asset used to legitimize the operation. • Is it “good value” at $1.50? No. At a market price of approximately $1.50 per share, ASST trades at a significant premium to its underlying assets. The valuation model in Section 6 of this report calculates a Net Asset Value (NAV) for common shareholders of approximately $0.95 per share. The stock trades at a -58% premium to its tangible assets, a premium built entirely on narrative, promotion, and the hope of future Bitcoin appreciation. • Is it a “scam”? “Scam” is a legal term. This analysis concludes that ASST is not a traditional fraud but exhibits the classic characteristics of a highly sophisticated, legally-papered, promotion-driven wealth transfer vehicle. The entire corporate structure appears engineered to facilitate a massive exit for private, pre-merger insiders at the expense of new, public-market retail investors.